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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR mE EASTER,\/ DISTRICT OF VIRGINLA 
(Alexandria Division) 
ROSETTA STONE LTD. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOGGLE r1'ic. 
Derendant 
: CMLACTION NO. I:09cv736 
: (GBLlTCB) 
GOOGLE lNC.'S OBJECnONS TO EVIDENCE A1',1) MOnON TO STJm<E 
6486 
Google lnc. ("Google"), hereby objects to certain documents and testimony att2ched to 
the declara:rions submitted by Rosetta Stone in support of its M2TCh 26, 20 10 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment as to Liability (Dkt. No. 103). For. the reasons set forth below, Google 
requests that the Court strike this purpoited evidence from the record end preclude it from the 
Coun's consideration of the parties' motions. 
1. Declaration of Jason Calhoun in Support Google objects that Mr. Calhoun's 
of Rosetta Stone Ltd.'s Motion for Partial declaration lacks foundation, constirutes 
Surrunary Judgment as to Liability hears4Y. is irrelevant, and is argumentative. 
("Calhoun Dec!. "), ~1 2, 3 (sentences 5, See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Fed. R. Evid. 401, 
6), 4- (sentences 1) 2), 5 (:sentences I, 2), 6 402, 403, 602; See Coleman v. Loudoun 
(last sentence), 7 (sentence 5), 8-1!. County School 3d., 294 Fed. Appx. 778, i82 
(4th Cir. 2008) (statements that are "self-
serving, unsubstantiated o~inions" cannot 
defezt a motion ior summary judgment); see 
also U.S. Y. Roane, 378 F. 3d 382, 400-40 I 
(4th Cif. 2004) (Such "airy generaliiies, 
conciusory assertions and hearsay statements 
[do] not suffice to stave off summary 
judgme!1t . .") (interna l quotation and 
citation omitted); Maryland Highways 
Contractors Ass '11, Inc. v. Stale of .lI..faryland. 
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2. Calhoun Decl., Ex. B. 
3. Dlhoun Decl., Ex. C. 
2 
933 F.2d 12·16, 1251 (4th Cir. 1991 ) (noting I 
th.t "hearsay evidence, which is inadmissible I 
at trial, cannot be considered cn a morion for 
summary judgment"). 
I Google objects thar Mr. Calhoun lacks 
! personal knowiedge to authenticate the 
I documents. See Fed. R. Evid. 901. 
Google objects that tbe cited evidence 
constitutes inadmissib!e hearsay_ Su Fed. R. 
Evid. 801. See also Roane, 378 F. 3d at 400-
401; Maryland Highways Contractors Ass 'n. 
i933 F.2d at 1251. Google further objects 
I that ' this evidence is not properly 
! authenticated by the Calhoun Declaration 
and lacks foundation. See fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(e); Fed R. Evid. 90I(b); Colemar., 294 
Fed. Appx . • t 782; see also, Williams v. 
Cerberon;cs, Inc., 871 F. 2d 452, 456 (4th 
! 
Cir. 1989) (holding that plaintiff's own' 
assertions, when contradicted by substantial 
evidence to the CO:1trary. are insufficient to 
support a claim for employment: 
! 
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4 Declaration of Van Leigh in Support of Google cbjects that Iv1r. Leigh's declaration 
I' Rosetta Stone LId.'s Motion far Partial lacks foundation. For example, Rosetta I 
Summary Judgment as to Liability Stone admits that it cannot determine if a 
("Leigh Dec I."), ~ 3. product is counterfeit without physicaJ!y 
inspecting it, and there is no indication that 
1v1r. Leigh has performed any such inspection 
of any products. See Fed. R. eiv. P. 56(e); 
Fed. R. Evjd. 602; Coleman. 194 Fed. Appx . . 
at 782. See alJo, Wiiliams, 871 F. 2dat 456. 
5. Declaration of ' Jennifer Spaziana in Gocgle objects to the cited deposition 
Support of Rosetta Stone Ltd:s Motion 
for Partia1 Summary Judgment as to 
Liability ("Spaziano Decl."), Tab A, 
3/3/10 deposition of Edward Allen Blair 
testimony as incomplete because the cited! 
I 
excerpts of testimony do not include relevant 
portions of Dr. Blair's testimony necessary 
for a fair understanding of his testimony and I 
i I do not include Dr. Blair's errata sheet. Fed. l 
R. Evid. 106. Additional portions of Dr. 
Blair's deposition ar! attached to the 
Declaration ofH. Lien l as Exhibit 26. 
The Lien Declaration was s!Jbmitted with Google's Opposition to Rosetta Stone's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability. . 
3 
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6. Spaziano DecL, Tab A, 2/23110 Google objects to the cited deposition I 
deposition of Terri Chen. testimony as incomplete. fed. R. Evid. 106. 
Fairness requires that additional tes timony be 
considered contemporaneously with the 
I 
I e-..=idr=nce offered by Rosetta Smne. 
i 
Additional portions of Ms. Chen's deposition 
are atl.3.ched to the Declaration of H. Lien ns 
I 
i Exhibit 25 . 
7~ Spaziano Decl., Tab A. 2126/10 Google obj::cts to the cited deposition 
deposition of Daniel Dulitz. testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106. 
Fairness requires th2.t additional testimony be 
considered contemporaneously with the 
I 
I evidence offered by Rosetta Stone. i 
! Additional portions of Me. Dulitz's 
deposition are attached to the Declaration of 
H. Lien as Exhibit 26. 
8. Spaziano Dec I., Tab A, 3/4/10 deposition Google objects to the cited deposition 
of Baris Gultekin. testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106. 
Fairness requires that additional (estirnony be 
considered contemporaneO'l:sly with the 
evidence offered by Rosetta Stone. 
Additional portions of Mr. Gultekin's 
4 
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deposition are attached to the Dec!!!.ration of 
H. Lien as E¥.hibit 29. 
9. I Spaziano Decl., Tab A, 3/511 0 de~osit1on Google objeots to ihe cited deposition 
I 
of Richard Holden. testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106. 
Faime3s requires that additional testimony be 
considered contemporaneously with the 
evidence offered by Rosetta Stone. 
, 
Additional ponions of Mr. Holden's: 
I deposition are attached to the Declaration of 
I .H. Lien as Exhibit 3l. 
--
10. Spaziano Decl., Tab A, 2125/!O' Googlo Gbjects to the cited deposition 
deposition ofeary Louie. testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106. 
Fairness requiies that additional testimony be 
considered contempo;aneously with rhe 
evidence offered by Rosetta Stone. 
Additional portions of Mr. Louie's 
deposition are at1.2ched to the Declaration of 
H. Lien as Exh,bit 33. r 
11. Spaziano Decl., Tab A, 3i5/10 deposition Google objects to the cited deposition 
of Rose Hagan. testimony as incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106 . 
. Fairness requires that additional testimony be 
considered colltemporeneously with the 
I 
i 
5 
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12. Spaziano Dec!., T.b A 
deposition of Bill Lloyd. 
13. I Spaziano DecL, Exs. 24-27. 
I 
evidence offered by Rosetta Slone. j 
Additional portions of Ms. Hag.,'s I 
deposition are attached ro dIe Declaration of I 
H. Lien as Exhibir 30. I 
3/10/10 Google objects to the cited deposition I 
testimony a; incomplete. Fed. R. Evid. 106. ! 
! Fairness requires that additional testimony be 
6 
considered contemporaneously with the 
evidence offered by Ros~rta Stone. 
Additional portions of r.1r. Lloyd's 
deposition are attached to the Declaration of I H. Lien.as Exhibit 32. 
I Google objects that rhe cited evidence 
irrelevant because it relates [0 third party 
trademarks r.ot at issue In this case, and 
because such complaints by trademark 
owners are not probative of actual confusion 
or willfulness in the present cas'!, See, e.g .. 
Renaissance. Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Dollar 
Tree Srores, inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 680, 697 
(E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that defendant's 
continued marketing of allegedly infringing i 
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14. Spaziano Decl., Exs. 8~ 1 L 
7 
p:OdUCiS after rc~eiving a c~ase and desist 
letter was not orobative of bad faith). 
i Arid'" II . - 'h - d I mOna y, none or t e rererence 
complaints identify a single inst.ance of 
I confusion relating to the use of Rosetta 
Stone's trademarks. Allowing these third 
party compiaints into evidence would be: 
unduly prejudicial and confuse the jury. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403; see alro, 
Vukadlnovich v. antz. 995 F.2d 750, 755·56 
(7th CiT. 1993) (affirming exclusion of 
evidence of prior complaints and lawsuits). 
Google also objects that such evidence 
constitutes inadmissible hearsay and lacks 
foundation. See Fed. R. Evid. 801; Roane, 
378 F. 3d at 400-401; see also. Maryland 
Highways Contraciors A.rs ·n, 933 F.2d at 
1251. 
I 
Google objects to the cited evidence because: 
(I) the studies cited used multiple search 
engines. not just Goog!c, so the conclusions 
! cannot be attributed to Google alone, (2) 
6493 
8 
I many lISers do not consider sponsored links 
ads but do see them as paid fef, 2nd (3) many 
users erroneously believe that website ' 
owners can pay Google to appear in [he 
organic search resdts . User experiences 
, 
i with other sc.:rch engines and general i 
perceptions of sponsoll:d fink ads have no I 
bearjng on how consum~rs perceive I 
sponso~d links appearing on GoogJe ' s 
search pages that utilize Rosetta Stone'S 
I trademarks. Trademark infringement actions 
depend on the likelihood of confusion 
between a senior user's mark and a junior 
user's use, end "detel1Tlining the likelihood 
I of confusion is an <inherently factual' issue I that depends on 'he facts and circumstances 
in each case." Lone Star Sleakhause & 
Saloon, inc. iI. Alpha oj Va., Inc., 43 FJd 
922,933 (4th Cir. 1995). As such, Cases in 
which the "facts and circumstances" were 
different tr,an the CUrrent case-<1ifferent 
trademarks were at issue, different 
ad,,·enisements, different products. different 
6494 
15 . Spaziano Decl., Exs. 12-15. 
9 
types and identities of advertisers, diffe rent 
CO;tsumer expectations-have no bearing on 
this lit~gation. These issueE render the 
studies irreie'Vant znd undu ly prejudicial and 
not probative as to actual confusion in this 
case. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 , 4Q2. 403; see 
also Vista Food Erchange. Inc. v. Vistal" 
Corp., 2005 WL 2371958, at '7 (E.D.NY. 
Sept. 27, 2005) (excluding survey as unfairly 
prej!.ldicia! bilSed on, among other reasons, 
failure to replicate market conditions); Simon 
Prop: Group TJ'. v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. 
Supp. 2d 1033, 1052 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(s.me). 
Google objects that the cited evidence is 
irrelevant because the studies cited do r.ot ! 
test Google', 2009 policy, which permits I 
- I I only u:;c of trademarks in the text of ! , 
, 
sponsored link adver6semems. Additionally. 
this evidence is unreliable and unduly 
prejudicia1. Moreover, as noted above, 
"determining the. IikeHhoad of confus ion is 
6495 
an 'inherently factual' issue that depends on 
the facts and circumstances in each case." 
, 
Lone Star Steakhollse, 43 F.3d at 933. l 
Studies in which different trademarks, ! 
I different advertisements, different products, I 
I different types and identities of .dvertisers, I 
J and different consumer expectations \I .. ·ere at 
I issue ha', e no bearing on this litigation. See 
i j Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403; see also 
I Objections to No. 15. 
16. Spaziano Decl ., Tab A, 3/8110 deposition Google objects that the citcd evidence is 
ofStcve Dubow. 
17. 1 Spaziano Oed ., Tab A, 
irrclevant because Mr. Dubow did not 
purchas~ the allegedly counterfeit software 
through a Google sponsored link . and he 
knew that he was not purchasing frorri 
Rosetta Stone directly. His testimony thus is 
not probative of possible consumer 
confusion arising from the use of Rosetta 
Stone's trademarks in connection with I 
. sponsored I jP-K advertisements appearing on 
i 
Google. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402 , 403. 
3112110 I Google objects that the cited evidence 
10 
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because Rosetta Stone canihJ[ 'I' deposition of Diana Stanley Thomas. irreie,vam 
establish that Ms. Thomas purchased 
counterfeit software and she knew [hat she 
was not purchasing from Rosetta Stone 
directly. Rosetta Stone admits that to 
determine whether software is cQunterfeit 
one would have to obtain the physical 
product: open il, a.,d test it on a computer. 
Declaration of M, Caruso2, Ex. 53, 124:2-
125:7. Rosetta Stone can,not definitively 
este.blish whether Ms. Thomas" purchased I 
counterfeit software because she des'"lJ'oyed 
the purportedly counterfeit product Roset"ll!. 
Stone ~ailed to preserve the purportedly I 
; 
counterfeit material even thcugh it had the i 
ability to do so, it knew the evidence was 
! relevant, and tt.is lawsuit was pending at the 
time Ms. Thomas reported her purchase. 
Because Rosetta Stone made it impo£sible to 
determine if she pUTchased c01.:mterfeit 
software. her testimony should be excluded. 
, 
The Caruso Declaration was submitted with Google's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11 
649; 
I Moreover, any confusion that existed was I' 
II not caused by Googie, since Ms. Thomas's . 
I tesnm~fiY suggesis [hat her purchase was 
influenced by the confusing nature of the 
website from which she purchased. See Fed. 
, 
I R. Evid. 401, 402, 403. 
18. ! Spaziano Decl., Tab A, 3/9/l0 deposition I Gaogle objects that the cited evidence is 
I of Deborah Jeffries, 311011 0 deposiricn of irrelevant because these witnesses testified 
Rita Porter, 2nd 3/11/10 deposition of that they knew they were not purchasing 
Denis Day Ie. from Rosetta Stone directly. Moreover, 
whatever confusion existed-was not caused 
by Google, since their testimony suggests 
that their purchases were influene¢d by the 
confusing nature of the websites from which 
they purchased. See Fed.. R. Evid. 401, 402, 
403. 
19. Spaziano Oed., Tab A, 9130/20041 Google objects that the probative value of 
deposition of Rose Hagan. and 11l2.9/06 the cited testimony is substantially 
deposition of Rose Hagan. outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, and 
misleading the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 , 
402, 403. This testimony was given in 
12 
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! d'f' " d' dl',"e,'", t I I Lerem aCIJOnS, regar mg l' '-
i I trademarks and c. different Google trademark 
, 
13 
: policy ~han is currently in place today_ 
Rosetta Stone also. failed to identify this prior 
I testimony in its Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures, 
, 
Instead. Rosetta Stone made a surprise 
disclosure in its tria l ::xhibit list three weeks 
after the close of discovery. Given the 
cumulative nature and minimal importance 
of the evidence, the Jack of any explana[ion 
for the late disclosure, and the incurable 
prejudice to GoogJe resulting. from the late 
disclosure, the testimony is not admissible at 1 
, 
trial. See S. States Rack & Fixlure, Inc. v. 
Sherwin,WiIliams Co" 318 F3d 592, 597 
(4th Cir. 2003) (excluding testimony of a 
witness disclosed on the eve of trial); Perkills I 
v, United SiDles, 626 F, Supp, 2d 587, 591 I 
(E,D. Va. 2009) (excluding witness I 
i 
1 test imony where the propounding part'!! 
failed to identify witness te..c;;tirnony in its 
, Ru le 26(a) disclosures) , 
6499 
